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RECENT CASES
arise from the cooperative's articles of association, by-laws, or other
binding contract.8 Distribution cannot depend upon an informal agree-
tuent betwceen the co-op and its members9 nor upon action taken by the
co-op after its receipt of the funds later distributed.'
In the instant case, the cooperative's by-laws were mandatory in re-
quiring distribution of the difference between the cost of operation
and selling price to members, but a subsequent amendment to the
articles of incorporation nullified these by-laws by leaving it to the
discretion of the board of directors to distribute any part of the dif-
ference. The leading case of Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Con mmis-
sioner seems clearly distinguishable. In that case by-laws required the
directors to distribute some part of the difference; only the amount
payable was left to their discretion. But in the principal case "the
very obligation itself to make such refunds" was within the dis-
cretion of the directors. 12 It is submitted that the court in the instant
case properly held that there was no binding obligation, and con-
sequently that even though distribution was effected, no allowable
deduction resulted.
American Box Shook Export Ass'n v. Commissioner, 156 F. 2d 629
(C. C. A. 9th 1946); United Cooperatives, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T. C.
93 (1944).
sPeoples Gin Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 7.
g American Box Shook Export Ass'n v. Commissioner, supra note 7.
But see Home Builders Shipping Ass'n v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 903
(1927), where an oral agreement was held to constitute a legal obliga-
tion.
10 Peoples Gin Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, note 7.
1188 F. 2d 75 (C. C. A. 7th 1937).
12 Associated Grocers of Alabama, Inc. v. Willingham, 77 F. Supp.
990 (N. D. Ala. 1948).
ABOLITION OF THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE IN
FLORIDA - EFFECT OF STATUTE ON WILLS
EXECUTED PRIOR THERETO.
Old laws, like old soldiers, die hard. The ancient Rule in Shelley's
Case, abolished in Florida by act of legislature,' appears to have been
revived by a recent case.2
These were the facts noted in the opinion: A testator directed that
O LAWS OF FLORIDA, 1945, c. 23126, see. 2, F.S.A. see. 689.17.
2 Elsasser v. Elsasser et al, Fla., 32 So. 2d 579 (Fla., 1947).
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the residue of his estate he held in trust for his wife during her life
and that it be distributed after her death. Income from the estate was
to be paid in three shares, two shares to the widow and one share to
the testator's father so long as the latter should live. Upon the death
of the wife, the principal was to be divided into four shares: one share
to the heirs of the wife and one each to the testator's father, mother,
and brother, or their heirs. The wife, claiming her share in fee, filed
a bill for construction of the will, seeking a declaratory decree to deter-
mine whether or not she was the owner in fee simple of one-fourth the
estate. An order of the Circuit Court ruling that she had no interest in
the principal was affirmed; the Supreme Court held that the Rule in
Shelley's Case does not apply to an equitable life estate followed by a
legal remainder. On these facts the court was correct in its holding.
3
There were two other facts that could have been material, namely,
that in June, 1945, the Florida legislature abolished the Rule in
Shelley's Case, and that in April of the same year the testator died.
These two facts of time the court failed to mention. It is true that in
order to determine the issue before it, the court need rot have referred
to these two facts inasmuch as their inclusion would not have affected
the decision, because by the terms of the will, as it was construed, the
Rule in Shelley's Case was inapplicable. 4 It made no difference in this
particular controversy whether the Rule was in effect, or not. It is
regrettable, though, that the court did not consider these two facts
material, for if it had done so, the court could have settled the trouble-
some problem of what effect the 1945 statute has on wills executed
prior thereto, and on property rights created by those testaments.
All facts of time are immaterial unless stated to he material and
those facts which are stated in the opinion are conclusive and cannot
be contradicted from the record. 5 If. however, the opinion onits a
fact which appears in the record, a. in this case these two facts did
(it is presumed), "this omniission may be due to (a) oversight, or (b)
an implied finding that the fact is immaterial. The second will be
assumed to be the case in the absence of other evidence."
6 There is no
evidence in the opinion of the Elsasser case to warrant the assumption
that the court did, in fact, overlook the two facts of time, for, as rlay
have been intended, the determination of the single issue therein pre-
sented is wholly complete. Two quite reasonable but utterly irreconcil-
able inferences compete for the puzzled lawyer's attentions. The first
3 Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 167 So. 669 (1936).
.. . . . . The court is of the opinion that the rule in Shelley's case
does not apply in this particular trust wherein the plaintiff has a life
estate in the equitable interest, and the legal remainder-as distinguished
from the equitable remainder-goes to her heirs . . . " Elsasser v.
Elsasser, supra.
5 Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, from "ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW," 1-26, CAMBRIDGE.
UNIVERSITY PRESS (1931).
6 Id. at 26.
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inference is that neither of the facts of time is material ; it follows,
that to construe a will it is necessary only to consider the laws in force
at the time the will was made, and that, conversely, it is proper to dis-
regard subsequent legislation.2 Although logical, this inference would
make for an unsatisfactory rule of law, as will be seen below. The
other valid inference is that the court may have purposed to announce
no principle of law other than the one it did, intentionally excluding any
reference to the two facts of time. For the following reasons this is the
more plausible inference.
A majority of the courts in this country have adhered to the view that
the construction of a valid will should, in the absence of any expression
of testatorial intention to the contrary, be controlled by the law in
force at the time of the testator's death, and not by the law in force
at the time of execution of the instrument.8 It is said that a will is
ambulatory until the death of the testator, which is a terse way of
saying that until the death of the testator the power of a person to
make a testamentary disposition is subject to the superior will of the
state, as expressed in its laws, if, to repeat, the will is valid.9 Conversely,
if a testator does not die before the enactment of a new law, his will
must be governed by it10 Thus, statutes abolishing estates tail, or, more
pertinently, the Rule in Shelley's Case, have been held in some cases
to apply to the will of a testator dying after the passage of such statute,
notwithstanding the will was executed prior thereto.' From these cases
the principle evolves that it is the death of the testator, rather than
the execution of the will, which is the significant event, because the
death of the testator is the occurrence which vests those property rights
7 By implication this might be the principle of the case. "The principle
of the case is found by taking account (a) of the facts treated by the
judge as material, and (b) his decision as based on them . . , In finding
the principle it is also necessary to establish what facts were held to
be immaterial by the judge, for the principle may depend as much on
exclusion as It does on inclusion." Ibid.
8 Hill v. Hill, 149 -Ga. 741, 102 S. E. 151, 10 ALR 1514 (1920). Annota-
tion: 66 ALR 1071; 129 ALR 863; Ann. Cas. 1913A 1290.
9 Pond v. Faust, 90 Wash. 117, 155 P. 776, Ann. Cas. 1918A 736, and
note (1916).
t0 Lincoln v. Aldrich, 149 Mass. 368, 21 N. E. 671, 4 LRA 215. Annota-
tion: Ann. Cas. 1913A 1290 (1889).
11 Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. 95, 70 Am. Dee. 105, 129 ALR 869 (1857).
In Reynolds v. Love, 191 Ala. 218, 68 So. 27, 129 ALR 869 (1915),
where the death of a testator, whose will had been executed while the
Rule in Shelley's Case was in force, occurred after the enactment of a
statute abolishing the rule, it was held that his will was not controlled
by such rule, but by statute. This case made no special distinction be-
tween the act abolishing the rule and other acts, and correetly followed
the broad principle as set forth in the leading case of Price v. Taylor.
But compare Reynolds v. Love with the cases noted in note 14 injra.
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that the Constitution seeks to protect from the caprice of legislatures.' 2
A legislature may intend, o the other hand, that the new statute is to
apply only to wills executed after its passage, in which case "in1chote'"
rights (to often an unfortunate fictio,) will not be disturbed. No such
legislative intent appears in the 1945 Florida act, which states simply
that upon the (late of its formal enactment tile Rule in Shelley's Case
be abolished; nor is the act so worded as to be remedial.'
A bewildered minority of courts have entertained, with varying
degrees of seriousness, the notion that since a will is presumed to he
made in view of statutes then existing and with the intent that such
statutes shall prevail, a court in looking about for an aid to construction,
will consider the laws in force at the time of execution of the will, even
though they had later been repealed. 4 Rather uniformly, the soundest
12 There is not one, but two distinct ratio decidendi behind this prop-
osition. The majority of cases follow that stated in Rowlett v. Moore,
252 Ill. 436, 96 N. E. 837 (1911): "Upon the death of a tetsator
property rights become fixed. If he leaves a valid will the title of the
legatees . . . becomes a vested right . . . " This statement is a compro-
mise between the power of the legislature and the rights of the individ-
ual; it recognizes that the individual will Is subordinate to the sovereign
will, but that the sovereign will is in turn subordinate to the supreme
law as embodied in the ex post facto and due process clauses in the
Constitution. It is what the up-to-date legalist would call "a balanc-
ing of social interests." This ratio decidendi has the advantage of rely-
ing on no presumptions for its existence, but on other rules of law. The
other ratio decidendi is less pretentious but relies on a presumption
which no scientific court would care to rmake, namely that " . - .
testators make their wills on the supposition that the state of law will
not be altered; and it is contended that this will ought to be construed
as it would have been under the old law. The answer to that is that a
testator that knows of an alteration in the law (as this testator must
be presumed to have done), and does not choose to alter his will, must
be taken to mean that his will shall take effect according to the new
law ...The act does not affect the meaning of the will; it only alters
its legal operation." Hasluck v. Pedley, LR 19 Eq. (Eng.) 271 (1874).
How the antithetical conclusion can be reached by this sort of reasoning,
see note 14 infra.
13 Note 1 srupra.
14 Rudolph v. Rudolph, 207 Ill. 266, 69 N. E. 834, 99 Am. Rep. 211
(1904). The further qualification is made that in determining the inten-
tion of a testator in the use of language capable of more than one con-
struction, the state of law at that time of execution is a factor to be con-
sidered. Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N. E. 956, 138 Am. St. Rep. 247
(1910). In Quick v. Quick, 21 N. J. Eq. 13 (1870) the Rule in Shelley's
Case was held to govern in the construction of a will made while such rule
was in force, although the rule was abolished before the death of the test-
ator occurred. The court noted the date of the passage of the act abolish-
ing the rule and the date of the death of the testator which was years
LN'oi. 2
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of these cases interpret the effect of later statutes on the validity of
earlier wills and say that a wil which is valid when it is executed is
valid forever afterwards, unless specifically remedial legislation is sub-
sequently passed.' 5 For example, if T executes a will attested by two
witnesses in 1492, and in 1776 the state in which he is domiciled eracts
a law requiring the attestation to be performed by three witnesses, T
need not make another will.
later, thereupon declaring, without argument: "But the rule was in force
at the date of this will .. .which must be construed by it if, by the
decisions in England and this state which control our courts, it applies
to this will." The case cited for authority was Kennedy v. Kennedy, 5
Dutcher 185 (1861), but it is not clear in what connection. The view
is best stated in Reynolds v. Love, note 11 supra, in which the court
said: "The general rule seems to be, as between laws in force at dif-
ferent times in the same jurisdiction, that the law existing at the time
the will was executed may be referred to in determining the testator's
intention; but the operative effect of the will and the rights of the
parties thereunder are to be determined by the law in force when the
rights of the parties accrued, and this ordinarily is the law existing at
the time of the testator's death, as against a law passed thereafter, or
as against a law existing when the will was made, unless a contrary
intent appears in the will. A law which is prospective merely does not
extend to a will executed before the law goes into operation, although
the testator does not die until afterwards. . . While the foregoing seems
to be the general rule, the authorities are not entirely harmonious on the
subject; some applying the law existing when the testator died;
others the law as it was when the will was made . . . The conflict in
the decisions arises largely, not as to what the general rule is, but in
the construction of subsequent statutes, and in determining whether or
not they were so worded as to be deemed prospective or retrospective."
This is the most incisively reasoned opinion in a great welter of cases.
It indicates that the first step is to determine the precise legislative
intent as well as the precise testatorial intent. Some statutes expressly
declare that they shall become effective only in respect to wills made
after the law goes into operation, or that they shall not extend to wills
made before the act is in force, Examples of cases involving such statutes
are: Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill. 150, 147 N. E. 788 (1925) and Re Lavine,
167 Misc. 879, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 923. Other statutes provide that they shall
apply to wills executed prior to a specified date. See, for example,
In Re Goldberg's Estate, 275 N. Y. 186, 9 N. R. 2d 829 (1937). It cannot
be stressed too strongly that the initial problem is construction of the
statute.
15 There is a conflict here too. In some jurisdictions the will must be
executed and attested as required by the law in force at the death of
the testator. Houston v. Houston, 3 McCord L. (S. C.) 491, 15 Am. Dec.
647 (1826); Lorleux v. Keller, 5 Iowa 196, 68 Am. Dec. 696 (1857). In
other jurisdictions it is held that the validity of a will should be deter-
mined by the law as it stood at the time of the actual execution.
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It is a cardinal rule of constrLIction that the testator's intention must
fail if there is an irreconcilable conflict between that intention and
established laws or public policy; the Florida Supreme Court has re-
peatedly asserted this view, qualifying that other cardinal rule of con-
struction that the intent of the testator is to prevail."
For it to be consistent with its own precedents, it is to be concluded
that the court must have omitted the two material facts of time solely
for the purpose of limiting the scope of the controversy. An alternative
conclusion fails to note the grain of the court's prior decisions.'
7
Packer v. Packer, 179 Pa. St. 580, 36 A. 344, 57 Am. St. Rep. 615 (1897);
Barker v. Hinton, 62 W. Va. 639, 59 S. E. 614, 13 Ann. Cas. 1150 and note
(1907). Either view is sound on principle. Again, reference should be
had first to legislative intent.
16 "The cardinal rule in the interpretation of wills, to which all other
rules must bend, is that the intention of the testator shall prevail, pro-
vided that it is consistent with the rules of law." Floyd v. Smith, 59
Fla. 485, 51 So. 537, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 651, 138 Am. St. Rep. 133, 21
Ann. Cas. 318 (1910). Apparently, then, whether or not the testator
intended to make a valid disposition is not too material; the question
is as to what provision the testator intended to make. Once the court
finds that intention, it will then proceed to determine whether the pro-
visions in which that intention is expressed are valid in the light of the
pertinent statutes and public policy.
17 Ide. And see Lee, 1 the Rule in Sheflesfs Case Abolished As To
Wills?, 25 Mich. L, R. 215. Is the poin tmade that since the Rule in
Shelley's Case overrides the testator's intention, a statute abolishing
the rule should do so similarly?
ADMINISTRATIVE LAV--REVIEW, ON APPEAL, OF
DISMISSAL FROM CIVIL SERVICE
The Florida Courts, in their consideration of the case of Kennett v.
Barber,' have established a precedent which, commenced in the
case of Hammond v. Curry,2 stands out as contrary to the well estab-
lished principles of administrative law, and will probably result ill the
consideration by Florida courts of many cases and appeals which would
meet with summary dismissal in the majority of jurisdictions. The Cir-
cuit Court, in the Barber case, granted a petition for a peremptory
1 31 So. 2d 44 (Fla., 1947).
2 153 Fla. 245, 14 So. 2d 390 (1943).
[ VOL. 2
